Ultimate Foundation of Private Property, Part II: Communication Ethics

In Part 1 I disputed the foundation on which Hans-Hermann Hoppe builds his argument ethics. Because his argument is based on the implications of argumentation itself, his argument leaves no room for recognition of ownership by actors who do not argue with one another. In Part 2, I will review these points, but focus mainly on reconstructing Hoppe’s argument using the basic act of communication, rather than the act of argumentation itself.

Read Part 2 here.

Ultimate Foundation of Private Property, Part I: Argumentation Ethics

I've finally finished my critique of Hoppe's argumentation ethics as well as Kinsella's estoppel approach. (It's not really a critique per se, but a subtle yet important reconstruction.) I got busy so I hadn't had time to finish editing it, but I've been wanting to show it to the world for the longest time. I think even Murphy and Callahan will like it.

That will be Part II and will be published in a few days. It follows this essay in which I discuss what I think is faulty about why Hoppe thinks his ethic (and more widely, praxeology itself) is true, as well as the problems his argument has with regard to actors mutually recognizing their respective property rights:

Read Ultimate Foundation of Private Property, Part I: Argumentation Ethics.